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INTRODUCTION
In late spring, on a bustling Saturday night in Times Square, Faisal
Shahzad rigged a car with a homemade bomb and walked away,
anticipating that it would explode once he had left the area.1 Fortunately,
the bomb was not properly made and it never inflicted the damage and
injury that Mr. Shahzad intended. 2 Two days later, on May 3, 2010, Mr.
Shahzad was arrested while on a plane about to depart from John F.
Kennedy International Airport for Dubai.3 Mr. Shahzad was taken into
custody and charged with several terrorism-related crimes. 4 Mr. Shahzad
was not initially read his Miranda rights. 5 Instead, he was interrogated
* Christie Tomm graduated from St. John's University School of Law magna cum laude in 2012. At St.
John's, the author was an Executive Notes and Comments Editor on the Journal of the Civil Rights and
Economic Development and clerked for the law firm of Kenny & Zonghetti, LLC. She is currently an
associate at Silverberg Zalantis LLP practicing land use, zoning, environmnetal and municipal law. The
author is very grateful to all the past and present students, faculty and staff associated with this journal
for helping her to write and publish this article.
I Press Release, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, Faisal Shahzad Sentenced
in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison for Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square (Oct. 5,
2010) [hereinafter U.S. Attorney]; John B. Quigley, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 5174,5176 (2011).
2 Jerry Markon, Life Term for failed Times Square Bomber, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2010, at A3;
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 343,
344 (2010).
3 Mark Mazzetti, Sabrina Tavernise & Jack Healy, Suspect, Charged,Said to Admit to Role in Plot,
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at Al; Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict
and Counterterrorism:Understandingthe Parametersof the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 1, 17 (2010).
4 U.S. Attorney, supra note 1; David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a CounterterrorismTool, 5 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (2011).
5 Peter Baker, Arrest Renews Debate About Rights of Suspects in Terrorism Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
at
available
2010,
5,
May
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res-9801E6DB153EF936A35756COA9669D8B63; Ryan T.
Williams, Stop Taking the Bait; Diluting the Miranda Doctrine Does Not Make America Safer From
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under the public-safety exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 6 Once law enforcement officials established that Mr.
Shahzad was not an immediate threat to public safety, he was read his
Mirandarights and continued to cooperate with law enforcement.7
While many suspected terrorists in Mr. Shahzad's place would have been
detained and eventually tried in military commissions, Mr. Shahzad was
not eligible under the Military Commission Act (MCA)8 because he is a
naturalized U.S. citizen. 9 Many believe that military commissions are
preferable for trying terrorists because they remove several procedural
safeguards present in the criminal justice system to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 10 However, the federal
criminal justice system is no less effective in prosecuting terrorists. Part I
of this Note will discuss the differences between the MCA and the federal
criminal justice system and reveal how the latter is in many ways more
effective in maintaining national security.
Because the MCA's jurisdiction is limited to crimes related to
terrorism, 11 this examination of the federal criminal justice system will
focus on the prosecution of suspected domestic terrorists. Under federal
statute, domestic terrorism is defined as activities that "involve acts
dangerous to human life that are in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State . . . and occur primarily within a territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 12 Additionally, a "terrorist act" is one
that is committed with the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population or government.13
Since Mr. Shahzad never went to trial,1 4 the courts have not confronted
Terrorism, 56 Loy. L. REv. 907, 924 (2010).
6 Mazzetti, Tavernise & Healy, supra note 3; Jack King & Ivan J Dominguez, Diverse Coalition
Urges Attorney General Holder to Reconsider His Call to Weaken Miranda Rights, 34-JUN CHAMPION
10, 11 (2010).
7 Mazzetti, Tavernise & Healy, supra note 3; King & Dominguez, supra note 6, at 11.
8 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2009).
9 See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2009) (stating that military commissions only apply to aliens); see also 10
U.S.C. § 948a (2009) (defining an "alien" as any person not a citizen of the U.S.).
10 See 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2009) (providing that statements of the defendant will be admissible in
evidence if made voluntarily and found to be of probative value based on the totality of the
circumstances); see also David Kris, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the Brookings Institution (June
11, 2010), available at http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/remarks-as-prepared-for-deliveryby-assistant-attomey-general-david-kris-at-the-brookings-institution-96163109.html (pointing out that
hearsay statements and confessions are admissible at a lower standard).
11 See 10 U.S.C. § 948c (stating that enemy belligerents are subject to trial by military
commissions).
12 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2010).
13 See Holly Fletcher, Militant Extremists in the United States, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9236/militantextremists-intheunitedstates.html.
14 See Markon, supra note 2; Shahzad Pleads Guilty to Times Square Bombing Charges, CNN
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the issue of whether his statements to law enforcement officials before he
was read his Miranda rights would have been admissible against him under
the public-safety exception. Part II will examine why the questioning of
Mr. Shahzad was constitutionally proper through an analysis of Supreme
Court cases that identify the policies and applications of the public-safety
exception.
The public-safety exception was first identified in 1984 in New York v.
Quarles.'5 There, the Court considered its controversial decision in
Mirandav. Arizona, 16 which required law enforcement officials to inform a
suspect taken into custody of certain fundamental rights in order to protect
them from incriminating themselves.17 However, in the twenty-seven years
since Quarles was decided, the exception has been applied inconsistently
and infrequently, with little direct guidance from the Court. 18 Incorporating
this exception into law enforcement procedures would expand the
approaches officials can take in confronting suspected terrorists.
Specifically, such a tool would permit law enforcement to question
terrorism suspects without having to advise them of their Miranda rights,
and would preserve the opportunity to use such statements at trial.
The Obama Administration has stated that in light of Mr. Shahzad's case
it would consider enacting legislation to extend the public-safety exception
specifically to terrorism cases.19 Part III-A explains why the interrogation
of suspected terrorists fits within the existing framework of the publicsafety exception; and Part III-B recommends how Congress should
approach drafting legislation consistent with the Miranda line of
jurisprudence.
Passing such legislation would be especially significant to opposing
terrorism. One of the boldest statements the U.S. can make against
terrorists is to try them in our criminal justice system. This system is the
(Jun. 21, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-2 1/justice/new.york.times.square.bomb 1_timessquare-bomb-pakistan? s=PM:CRIME.
15 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
16 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17 See id. at 479 (identifying certain rights that custodial suspects must be informed of before being
interrogated).
18 See Jeffrey S. Becker, Comment, A Legal War on Terrorism: Extending New York v. Quarles
and the Departurefrom Enemy Combatant Designations, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 831, 869 (2003) ("The
Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of the public safety exception since its decision of Quarles
in 1984. Because the Court's determination in Quarles focused on an imminent threat to public safety,
one can only speculate what other circumstances would weigh in favor of a public safety exception.");
Quarles,467 U.S. 649.
19 See Charlie Savage, Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2010, at Al; see also Benjamin Weiser, Hearing on Terror Suspect Explores Miranda Warning, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/nyregion/us-terror-hearingexplores-use-of-miranda-waming.html.
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product of over two hundred years of democracy. For centuries the U.S. has
stood for a criminal justice system that convicts the guilty while protecting
certain fundamental rights for everyone. 20 Resorting to the MCA would
reveal unnecessary distrust in this system, which is the backbone of a free
nation. 2 1 Instead, focusing efforts on making the federal criminal justice
system as powerful and effective as it can be will demonstrate
unequivocally that the U.S. need not forfeit its democratic values in order
to protect the nation. 22
I. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS A POWERFUL TOOL FOR
PROSECUTING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
In the years following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
Bush Administration developed alternative methods for prosecuting
suspected terrorists. 2 3 One was the MCA, which permits non-citizen
terrorists to be detained and tried under different legal rules and standards
than those of the federal criminal justice system. 24 The MCA does not
provide all of the procedural safeguards present in the federal criminal
justice system to protect the interests and rights of the accused. 25 For
instance, confessions may be admissible in a military commission without

20 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 13 2007),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/military-commissions-act-2006
("Our Constitution is what
distinguishes America from other countries. It's what makes us Americans. To do away with its
protections makes us more like those we are fighting against.").
21 See Eun Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the Evidentiary Rules for
Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 140 (2007)
(noting that the Framers of the constitution were skeptical of military tribunals and free nations avoid it
whenever necessary); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760 (1996).
22 See Choi, supra note 21, at 146 (revealing that the criminal justice system maintains its balance
of values, procedures, and substance through involvement of all three branches of government); see
also Sarah Metha, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, At Guantanamo: Enough Already (Feb. 16,
2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/guantanamo-enough-already ("We should use our
tried and true federal courts, instead of perpetuating a discredited military commissions systems that is
recognized as a dark stain on American history.").
23 See Kim D. Chanbonpin, Ditching "The Disposal Plan:" Revisiting Miranda in an Age of
Terror,20 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 155, 156 (2008) (stating that President Bush repeatedly vowed to bring
terrorists to justice); Michael Abramowitz and Colum Lynch, In U.N. Speech, Bush Focuses on
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/09/23/AR2008092300114.html (documenting President Bush's speech to the
U.N. focused on terrorism).
24 See Kris, supra note 10 (pointing out that in military commissions non-capital cases only need
two-thirds of the jurors for a conviction and hearsay is more easily admissible); see also David A. Love,
Military Tribunals are a Threat to the Constitution, COMMON DREAMS (Dec. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/viewsO1/1201-03.htm.
25 See Chanbonpin, supra note 23, at 160 (noting that the reason for creating the military
commissions was because .'it [was] not practicable to apply ... the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts').
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concern for Fifth Amendment rights as long as they are made voluntarily. 26
Additionally, when suspects are tried in military tribunals, they are often
detained for much longer periods of time without a trial.27 Circumventing
these procedural safeguards that protect suspects' constitutional rights has
caused considerable distrust of the U.S. government, which has negated
many of the "benefits" of the MCA.28
Despite the mixed benefits of the MCA, the federal criminal justice
system has several procedural advantages that should be acknowledged and
appreciated. First, because the MCA is limited to non-citizens, there are
several instances where it cannot be utilized. In those cases, use of the
federal criminal justice system is necessary. Suspected terrorists who were
born in the United States, like the Oklahoma City bombers, Timothy
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, or have become naturalized citizens, like Mr.
Shahzad, have been indicted in the federal criminal justice system without
incident. 29
Furthermore, the federal criminal justice system thwarts terrorist activity
in one of three ways: disrupting terrorist plots by taking conspirators into
custody; incapacitating convicted terrorists through incarceration; and
providing a vehicle for gathering intelligence through interrogations. 30
These three methods are often interrelated. For instance, if law enforcement
officials have a strong case that is likely to lead to a conviction at trial, the
suspect may be more inclined to share information in exchange for a lesser
sentence. 3 1 Conversely, the more information the prosecution can use
26 See Kris, supra note 10; see also 10 U.S.C. §948c (2009).
27 See Louis Fisher, Military Commissions: Problems ofAuthority and Practice, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J.
15, 52 (2006) (noting that the Bush administration after 9/11 claimed it had the right to hold U.S.
citizens as "enemy combatants" and detain them indefinitely without being charged or tried); Kris,
supranote 10, at 21 ("Law of war detention is designed to take people out of the fight for the duration
of the conflict. So, if the detention is lawful, they can be held until the end of the war.").
28 See Chanbonpin, supra note 23, at 156 (noting that the actions of the Bush administration have
been "tainted with recurring allegations of torture"); Guantanamo Global Justice Initiative, The Facts
About

the

Military

Commissions

Act,

CENTER

FOR

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS,

http://ccrjustice.org/files/MCA%2OFactsheet%209-23-08.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (asserting that
the MCA stripped away the fundamental rights of those held in U.S. custody).
29 See Chanbonpin, supra note 23, at 174-75 (stating that district courts have successfully
prosecuted suspected terrorists in the case of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing, the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the
twentieth 9/11 terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui); Jo Thomas, McVeigh Ends Appeal of His Death
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al 8 (describing the trial and conviction of Terry Nichols).
30 See Josh White & Keith B. Richburg, Terror Informant for FBI Allegedly Targeted Agents,
WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2008, at A01 (describing the case of a terrorist who cooperated with law
enforcement authorities, which led to valuable intelligence); Kris, supranote 10, at II (arguing that law
enforcement disrupts terrorist pots through arrests, incapacitates terrorists through incarceration, and
gathers intelligence from interrogation).
31 See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 724 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (arguing that
prosecuting terrorist agents might provide sufficient incentives for the agent to cooperate with the
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against the suspect at trial, the longer the suspect will be incarcerated and
thus unable to plot and/or commit any more terrorist acts. 3 2 These tactics
are especially useful when put in the hands of U.S. Attorneys, law
enforcement agents from intergovernmental terrorist task forces, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, who are specially trained in maximizing
opportunities to obtain intelligence and effectively prosecute terrorists. 33
Another asset to the federal criminal justice system is its breadth. It
provides many more offenses that a criminal defendant can be charged
with. Conversely, in military commissions, the charges are limited to
terror-related crimes. 34 The addition of criminal charges increases the
likelihood of conviction and ensures longer periods of incarceration. 35
Likewise, the sentences for each crime the defendant is charged with in the
federal criminal justice system will be subject to stricter and more well
established sentencing guidelines. 36 In fact, these guidelines provide for
mandatory higher sentences when the crimes are related to, or in
furtherance of, an act of terrorism. 3 7
government); Kris, supra note 10, at 12 ("[T]he fact is, when the government has a strong prosecution
case in an Article 3 court, the defendant knows this, and he knows that he will spend a long time in a
small cell, which creates powerful incentives for him to cooperate with us . . . .").
32 See Evan Perez, Miranda Issues Cloud Gitmo Cases, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at A4
(describing how the failure of FBI officials to administer the Miranda warnings to detainees might lead
to legal challenges if the detainees's statements are introduced at trial); Kris, supra note 10, at 26-27
(stating that the use of Miranda warnings enhance the capacity to detain and incapacitate terrorists
because they provide evidence that can be used at criminal trials).
33 See U.S. Attorney, supra note 1 (crediting the conviction of Mr. Shahzad to the investigative
efforts of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, the New York Police Department, the Justice
Department's National Security Division, among other law enforcement agencies); Kris, supra note 10,
at 11 ("Between September, 2001 and March, 2010, the Department of Justice convicted more than 400
defendants in terrorism related cases.").
34 See Kris, supra note 10, at 20 (revealing that the federal criminal justice system has far more
crimes that apply to everyone); see generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 948d, 950t (2006) (listing the various
charges that can be brought in a military commission, and stating that military commission jurisdiction
is limited only to charges listed in that statute).
35 See Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a "Terrorist"?Drawingthe Line Between CriminalDefendants
and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2008) (citing Department of Justice,
Introduction to National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and
Terrorism-Related Convictions, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/doj032610-stats.pdf) (identifying
other charges that suspected terrorists can have brought against them, including "fraud, immigration,
firearms, drugs, false statements, perjury, and obstruction ofjustice")).
36 See Kris, supra note 10 (noting that more certain and well-established rules of the federal
criminal justice system will speed up the process and result in more reliable long-term incarceration);
see also Colin A. Kisor, The Needfor Sentencing Reform in Military Courts, 58 NAVAL L. REv. 39, 39
(2009) (arguing military court-martials often results in unreasonably light sentences and inconsistent
results).
37 See Transcript of Plea at *9-12, United States v. Shahzad, 10-CR-541, (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010),
availableat http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/0611shap.pdf (listing the charges against
Mr. Shahzad which carry a maximum sentence of life in prison, and include attempted use of a weapon
of mass destruction, conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit an act of
terrorism transcending national boundaries, and attempting an act of terrorism transcending national
boundaries); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3Al .4(2006) (providing increased sentencing for those convicted of a
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In the years following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was
heavily criticized for participating in anti-terrorism maneuvers that were
constitutionally invalid.3 8 Allegations of torture, wiretapping, and violation
of Due Process were undeniable. 39 This has led to a national and
international loss of confidence in the U.S. government. 40 This loss of
confidence has tangible consequences. For example, many countries will
not cooperate with the U.S. when the U.S. is holding one of its citizens
under the MCA.41 Unlike in the federal criminal justice system, the MCA
does not provide assurances that its practices will comply with the Geneva
Convention and other international treaties. 42 This is especially problematic
because the cooperation of other countries is critical to maintain national
security within our borders. The U.S. may be able to learn of other terrorist
plots through the interrogation of the suspected terrorists held under the
MCA, but without the assistance of other countries in investigating these
leads and arresting suspects, the benefit of being able to interrogate without
providing Miranda warnings diminishes considerably. 4 3

federal crime of terrorism).
38 See Becker, supra note 18, at 848 (noting that President Bush has been criticized for committing
an "unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental liberties") (citing Anne English French, Note, Trials in
Time of War: Do the Bush Military Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225,
1227 (2002)); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, Military Tribunals: Too BroadA Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2001.
39 See Chanbonpin, supra note 23, at 156-57 (listing beatings, extreme isolation, hooding, mock
executions, use of dogs, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding as the alternative procedures employed
by the Bush administration); see also Dana Priest, Officials Relieved Secret is Shared, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 2006 ("Prisoners were subjected to harsh interrogation techniques including feigned drowning,
extreme isolation, slapping, sleep deprivation, reduced food intake, and light and sound bombardment -sometimes in combination with each other.").
40 See Kris, supra note 10; see also Why Torture Makes Us Less Safe, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/torture-on-tv/less-safe/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2012) ("Cruel treatment leads to a loss of confidence and respect within the communities where
U.S. forces operate . . . .").
41 See Kris, supra note 10 ("Unfortunately, some countries won't provide us with evidence we may
need to . . . prosecute them in military commissions."); see also Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil Jr.,
Nov. 24, 2001, available at
Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/24/intemationalleurope/24SPAI.htmlex=1007620920&ei=1&en=87
2fe48002d9dba6&pagewanted-print.
42 See 10 U.S.C. §948b(e) (2009) (providing that the Geneva Convention is not a basis for a right
of action when an enemy combatant thinks their rights under the convention have been violated due to
the military tribunal process); see also Chanbonpin, supra note 23, at 174 (demanding that criminal
tribunals that are used to try terror suspects must provide internationally recognized due process rights
to the accused, which is not the case with the military commission system).
43 See Kris, supra note 10 (conceding that in some instances other countries will only extradite
suspected terrorists on the condition that they are not tried in military commissions); see also Sam
Dillon & Donald G. McNeil Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001
at
available
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/24/intemational/europe/24SPAI.html?ex=1007620920&ei=l&en=87
2fe48002d9dba6&pagewanted-print ("Spain will not extradite ... unless the United States agrees that
they would be tried by a civilian court and not by the military tribunals. . . .").
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Furthermore, within the United States, the public's distrust of the
administration is palpable. The controversial activities in Guantanamo Bay
are particularly problematic. In addition to speculation about the
interrogation tactics, the public was denied access to the proceedings,
which further fueled suspicion.44 In attempting to restore the public's faith
in our system of government, the federal criminal justice system provides
an open forum for the public to observe the proceedings. This would
demonstrate to the national and international community that the U.S.
respects the rights of the accused and is committed to the fundamental
concept of the "presumption of innocence." 45
The recent controversy over whether to hold the trial of the Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, the "9/11 Mastermind," in the Southern District of
New York reinforces this proposition. 46 Many believe that holding the trial
in New York would not be ideal, because its visibility would reopen the
wounds of a city deeply affected by the events of 9/11 and create a security
risk in the area. 47 At the same time, however, trying Mr. Mohammed in the
Southern District of New York allows the public to be aware of how the
case is proceeding. This would not be possible if the trial was held in
Guantanamo Bay.
Therefore, in addition to being the only venue for trying terrorists of
American citizenry, the federal criminal justice system provides distinct
strategic advantages in investigating and trying terrorists.
II. THE PUBLIC-SAFETY EXCEPTION IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
VALID TOOL
While advocates of the MCA argue that it is the most effective way to
secure confessions from suspected terrorists, the public-safety exception is
a parallel tool of the federal court system that serves a similarly useful
44 See Metha, supra note 22 (expressing frustration that the details of a plea deal were kept under
seal); see also Katherine Flanagan-Hyde, Note, The Public's Right of Access to the Military Tribunals
and Trials of Enemy Combatants, 48 ARIz. L. REv 585, 586 (2006) (arguing for the existence of a
constitutional right of the public to trial proceedings under the First Amendment).
45 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).
46 See Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, THE
NEW
YORKER
(Feb.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fafactmayer; see also Administrator, Rep.
King: Continuing Debate Over 9/11 Trials 'Makes Us Look Foolish', THE HILL (Apr. 18, 2010, 3:30
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-roominews/92913-rep-king-debate-over-91 1-trials-makesus-look-foolish.
47 See Mayer, supra note 46 (describing the strong emotions of the public in response to Mr.
Mohammed's trial being held in New York); see also Baker, supra note 5 (stating that New York is a
large terrorist target and having the trial there would increase that threat).
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function. The public-safety exception became an issue subsequent to the
Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona. In that case, a 5-4 majority, heavily
influenced by the criticism of the criminal justice process that were
prevalent at the time, 48 departed from the established constitutional
analysis of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 49 The
Court referenced an investigation by the Civil Rights Commission from the
early 1960's that revealed that police departments used physical force to
obtain confessions from suspects,o and several police manuals that
sanctioned the practice of inflicting mental and emotional abuse to achieve
confessions.si The Miranda Court was particularly concerned with
coercive interrogation techniques in custodial interrogations, that is,
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 52 The test prior to Miranda was a case-by-case, analysis,
based on the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether a suspect's
statements were made voluntarily or within the will of the defendant. 53 The
Miranda Court believed there was no way to know if the statements were
made voluntarily because the interrogations took place behind closed doors
and psychological abuse would not be evident by a physical mark. 54 Based
on this, Justice Warren revealed that this risk of coercion is not just a risk at
48 See Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground Between
Mirandaand the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2779, 2786 (2009) (identifying the political climate
in 1966 as the peak of the criminal procedure revolution); see also M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden
andLindh: Confessions Law in An Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 338 (2003)
(prefacing a discussion on Miranda by pointing out that the Court reviewed police manuals that
employed procedures that encouraged confessions).
49 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .").
50 Miranda,384 U.S. at 446; see Darmer, supranote 48, at 338.
51 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (stressing that the modem practice of custodial interrogations are
psychological rather than physical); see Darmer, supra note 48, at 338 (noting that the Miranda Court
"surveyed police manuals that encouraged the police to use relentless questioning techniques and
psychological ploys to encourage confessions").
52 Miranda,384 U.S. at 444; see Fred Medick, Exporting Miranda: Protectingthe Right Against
Self-Incrimination When U.S. Officers Perform CustodialInterrogations Abroad, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 173, 178 (2009) (identifying a suspect being in custody to mean when a reasonable person in
their position would believe that their freedom has been deprived in a significant way).
53 See George M. Dery III, The "Illegitimate Exercise of Raw Judicial Power:" The Supreme
Court's Turf Battle in Dickerson v. United States, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 47, 50 (2001) (stating that Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence before Miranda was a voluntariness standard but upon realizing that the
standard did not fit perfectly within the Fifth Amendment the standard began to veer toward a totality of
the circumstances analysis); see also Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
54 See Dery, supra note 53, at 53-54 (reasoning that the Court concluded that custodial
interrogation created an atmosphere of coercion because the interrogation practices occur in secrecy and
are psychologically, rather than physically, oriented); see also Roth, supra note 48, at 2789 (noting that
the Court found suspects would be vulnerable when stuck in a private room with interrogators and no
judicial supervision).
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all, but in fact a guaranteed outcome: a suspect subjected to a custodial
interrogation without being advised of his rights encounters per se
coercion.55
Therefore, the Court held that in order to prevent self-incrimination, a
barrier had to be raised in order to keep custodial interrogations free of
coercion. 56 The Court's remedy was to inform the suspect of certain
fundamental rights prior to questioning him: "the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him." 57 Only after this information was provided
to the suspect could he waive these rights and continue the interrogation
voluntarily. 58 The Court noted that the suggested method was not the only,
or best, way to go about solving this problem. 59 In fact, the Court
encouraged legislatures to use their own "creative" maneuvering to develop
their own guidelines, as long as it complied with the constitutional
minimum that "the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' 60
In the forty-four years since Miranda, subsequent cases have narrowed
this holding considerably in order to accommodate competing policies of
practicality and fairness. 6 1 These conflicting goals were addressed in New
York v. Quarles, where the Court identified a public-safety exception
within the framework of Miranda.62 In Quarles, two police officers chased
55 See Miranda,384 U.S. at 457 (stating that such an interrogation environment creates a "badge of
intimidation"); see also Roth, supra note 48, at 2788-89 (pointing out that the underlying assumption in
the Court's decision was that a custodial interrogation by definition has a coercive element); Darmer,
supra note 48, at 338 (identifying one of the Miranda holdings is that stationhouse interrogation is
inherently coercive).
56 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be
the product of his free choice."); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (referring to
the rationale in Miranda that something more than the totality-of-the-circumstances test was necessary
to account for involuntary custodial confessions).
57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
58 See id. (declaring that the suspect cannot waive the rights until he is informed of them).
59 See id. at 467 (perceiving that there are other possible measures that states and Congress could
use to protect this privilege).
60 Id. at 460 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
61 See Dery, supra note 53, at 66 (noting that the Court has had the opportunity to analyze the
Mirandaholding in a variety of Fifth Amendment contexts in the decades since it was decided); see
e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436 (1974) (considering Miranda where incomplete warnings
were given); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1985) (examining Miranda as it interacts with the
concept of taint).
62 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (holding that there is a public-safety
exception to the requirement that Mirandawarnings be given in order for a suspect's statements to be
admissible at trial); see Roth, supra note 48, at 2792 (stating that the Court in Quarles created a publicsafety exception to the Mirandawarnings).
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a man who matched the description of a suspected rapist into a supermarket
late at night. 63 Once in the store, the police cornered the suspect and
restrained him with handcuffs. 64 When one of the officers searched the
suspect and found an empty gun holster, he asked the suspect where the
gun was. 65 The suspect said, "the gun is over there," and nodded in the
direction of some cartons. 66 The officer retrieved the gun and then
informed the suspect of his Miranda rights.67 When the defendant was
indicted for criminal possession of a weapon, he argued that the use of his
statements regarding the location of the gun violated his constitutional
rights since he was in custody and had not been Mirandizedwhen he made
them. 68
The Quarles Court was addressing the right against self-incrimination in
a context far different from that considered in Miranda. In Miranda, the
Court required that the warning be read to a suspect when he was in "an
interrogation environment ... created for no purpose other than to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." 69 However, that was
not the situation in Quarles.70 Here, the interaction between the officers
and suspect was in the presence of bystanders, who would witness if the
suspect were being coerced. 71Additionally, in Quarles, the police were not
primarily concerned with obtaining incriminating information, but instead
were consumed with protecting the public from the dangers associated with
a possibly loaded gun hidden in the store. 72 The Quarles Court reiterated
that the Miranda warnings are not mandated by the constitution, but are
simply one way of ensuring the right against self-incrimination is not
violated.73 Given the differences between the circumstances of Quarles and
what the procedural safeguards in Miranda were intended to protect
against, the Court implemented a balancing test in which the risk of the
suspect being coerced into incriminating himself was weighed against the
63 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651-52.
64 Id. at 652.
65 Id
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653.
69 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
70 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
71 See Roth, supra note 48, at 2793 (distinguishing Quarles from Miranda in that "the detention
took place outside the police station, where the officer's conduct was exposed to public scrutiny").
72 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656; see Roth, supra note 48, at 2793 (stating that the officers were not
concerned with securing a conviction, but with averting an immediate danger).
73 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 ("The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are 'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution . . . ."').
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risk to the public if the police officers did not get information from the
suspect about the location of the gun. 74 In light of this analytical approach,
the Court found that the police were justified in questioning the defendant
before he was provided with his Miranda rights, and therefore the
statements were admissible against him at trial. 75
In so holding, the Quarles Court was conscious of the internal struggle a
police officer goes through when confronted with such a situation, and
"decline[d] to place the officers ... in the untenable position" of having to
decide between the immediate need to protect the public versus the longterm goal of convicting the criminal. 76 The Court expressed confidence that
officers would be able to innately identify the situations where the
exception was applicable, noting its intention to "free [police officers] to
follow legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger
to the public-safety." 77
The Court also distinguished the facts of Quarles from those of Orozco
v. Texas;78 clarifying that the public-safety exception was not applicable in
Orozco because "they did not in any way relate to an objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate
danger associated with the weapon." 79 Therefore, for the public-safety
exception to apply there must be: 1) an objective belief by the officers that
they needed to act in order to resolve; and 2) an immediate danger. If these
conditions were met, then only those statements made by the suspect
regarding the officer's attempt to neutralize an immediate danger would be
admissible at trial. 80
Unfortunately, because the Court stated that its holding was made "on
74 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657 (concluding that the need for information regarding a threat to the
public-safety outweighed the need for prophylactic rules protecting the Fifth Amendment right not to
self-incriminate); see Roth supra note 48, at 2793 ("[E]nsuring that police officers carry out their
peacekeeping duty during dangerous intervals, outweighed Miranda's concern regarding confessions
produced through coercion.").
75 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56 ("We hold that on these facts there is a 'public-safety' exception to
the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence....").
76 Id. at 657-58; see Medick, supra note 52, at 182 (identifying the circumstances in which the
Court believed considerations of public policy justified not providing Miranda warnings); see also
Joseph Yockey, Note, The Case for a Sixth Amendment Public-Safety Exception After Dickerson, 2004
U. ILL. L. REv. 501, 531 (2004) (revealing the desire of the Court to assist police officers confronted
with "split-second" decisions).
77 Quarles,467 U.S. at 659.
78 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In Orozco, the murder had been committed four hours before the officers
entered the defendant's boardinghouse where he was sleeping and began interrogating him without
informing him of his Miranda rights.
79 Quarles,467 U.S. at 659, n. 8.
80 See Michigan v. Attebury, 624 N.w.2d 912, 916 (Mich. 2001) (noting that the statements at
issue were regarding questions intended to locate a missing weapon).
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these facts" 8 1 and that the public-safety exception is a narrow one, 82 it has
led to a scarce application in the lower courts. 83 Specifically, out of fear
that a broad interpretation would swallow Miranda whole, lower courts
have limited the application of the public-safety exception solely to those
cases that are factually similar to Quarles.84 This narrow application of
Quarles has likely made law enforcement officials hesitant to apply the
public-safety exception. If the officer interrogates a suspect in custody
under the presumption that the public-safety exception applies, and then it
is later established at trial that the exception was inapplicable, then all
statements made by the defendant, before and after he was read his
Miranda rights, may be inadmissible. 85
However, the Quarles Court did not intend for the exception to be
restricted to its facts. The Court had broad goals of protecting public safety
and allowing police officers the flexibility to act instinctively in
"kaleidoscopic situations" without having their actions later questioned. In
addition, the Court chose not to adopt the dissent's approach of avoiding a
constitutional violation by eliminating the statements from trial because
that would mean expanding Miranda beyond its intended purpose of
preventing coerced confessions. 86 Automatically excluding the statement,
when there is minimal risk of coercion, would unnecessarily punish the
officers who were just trying to neutralize a dangerous situation. 87
This theme of veering away from the bright-line Mirandarule in favor of
a policy that would be favorable toward the public and the criminal justice

81 Quarles,467 U.S. at 655.
82 Id. at 658.
83 See United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp.2d 388, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that the publicsafety exception did not apply because the government did not prove it was necessary to interrogate the
suspect before Mirandizinghim); see also United States v. Benjamin, No. 10-131, 2010 WL 2978042,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2010) (noting that the public-safety exception is narrow, and therefore cannot
apply every time a weapon may be found during a search, or else it could swallow the rule in Miranda);
see also Attebury, 624 N.W.2d at 917 (holding that the public-safety exception applied when the
circumstances were similar to those of Quarles).
84 Rumble, 714 F. Supp.2d at 397.
85 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612 (2004) (holding that the statements made by the suspect
after the Miranda rights were given were not admissible because there was a pre-Miranda
interrogation); see Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 327 (2003) (stating that prosecutors can argue that the public-safety
exception applies but there is no guarantee that the court will accept the argument, and if it does not
then the statements may not be admissible).
86 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7 ("[A]bsent actual coercion by the officer, there is no constitutional
imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that results from police inquiry of this kind; and we
do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require us to exclude the evidence, thus
penalizing officers for asking the very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect
themselves and the public.").
87 Id.
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system was not new at the time of Quarles. In Harris v. New York, 88 the

Court addressed a situation where the defendant made statements to police
that were not admissible under Miranda, but then chose to testify at trial,
where he contradicted those statements. 89 The Court held that "the shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by
way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances."90 Similar to the balancing test in Quarles, the Harris Court
held that the risk of manipulation to the criminal justice system through
perjury outweighed the risk that the defendant's constitutional rights would
be violated. 9 1
In a more recent decision, the Court again affirmed the approach of
narrowing the scope of Miranda. In United States v. Patane,92 a plurality of

the Court held that because non-testimonial evidence cannot violate the
Self-Incrimination Clause, physical evidence discovered as a product of the
un-Mirandized, but voluntarily made, statements are admissible. 93 The
Patane Court reasoned that the "characterization of Miranda as a
constitutional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the closest possible
fit between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any judge-made rule
designed to protect it."94
III. CONGRESS ISCONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED IN PASSING
LEGISLATION PERMITTING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO
IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC-SAFETY EXCEPTION WHEN INITIALLY
INTERROGATING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
Guided by the principles underlying Mirandaand Quarles, it is a natural
transition to apply the public-safety exception to suspected domestic
terrorists. Congress should pass legislation clarifying that law enforcement
officials are permitted to interrogate domestic terrorists under the publicsafety exception. In doing so, this would make even more effective the use
88 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
89 Id. at 223.
90 Id. at 226.
91 Id. at 224 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)) ("It is one thing to say that
the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to
say that the defendant can tum the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession
was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths.").
92 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
93 Id at 639 ("[Sltatements taken without Miranda warnings (though not actually compelled) can
be used to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial .....
94 Id. at 643.
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of the federal criminal justice system in the prosecution of terrorists.
A. The public-safety exception applies to suspected terrorists.

Most concerns regarding the application of the public-safety exception to
the interrogation of suspected terrorists focus on the immediacy
requirement. The immediacy requirement has been interpreted narrowly to
find an immediate danger if the danger only is as temporally close to
inflicting harm to the public as in Quarles.95 This, however, should not
inhibit the application of the exception to suspected terrorists for two
reasons. First, the policy goals of the Quarles Court would not be achieved
by a test that was entirely dependent upon the timing of the threat. Second,
even if limited by a narrow application of the immediate threat
requirement, the interrogation of a suspected terrorist still fits within the
framework.
With respect to the timing of the threat, the Quarles Court stated that it
was justified in modifying the bright-line Mirandarule to make it easier for
police officers to know what they could do in high-risk situations to protect
the public without forfeiting a conviction. 96 The Court believed that police
officers would be able to instantaneously determine whether the exception
applies, and opposed those determinations being critically scrutinized after
the fact. Thus, such an approach gave a large amount of discretion to the
intuition of police officers. Employing a test that would bring into doubt
the appropriateness of the officers' actions based on whether the threat was
immediate would contradict this approach.
Likewise, because the public-safety exception applies to custodial
interrogations, the Quarles Court also relied on the judgment of law
enforcement officials to determine whether a suspect should initially be
taken into custody. To take a suspect into custody, there must be probable
cause that the suspect committed, or attempted to commit, a crime. 97 In the
95 See Rumble, 714 F. Supp.2d at 392 (noting that the public-safety exception is narrow, and
therefore cannot apply every time a weapon may be found during a search, or else it could swallow the
rule in Miranda); see also Sievert, supra note 85, at 324 (stating that the public-safety exception cases
all relate to questioning regarding an "imminent identifiable threat").
96 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 ("[W]e recognize here the importance of a workable rule 'to guide
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."' (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979))).
97 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925) ("'[G]ood faith is not enough to
constitute probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts within the knowledge of the . . . agent,
which in the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable."); see also Rodarte v. City of
Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1255 (Wyo. 1976) ("Mere suspicion coupled with the officers' good faith will
not suffice as probable cause for arrest. The officer must possess a factual knowledge which leads him
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case of a suspected terrorist, there must be probable cause of an act to
"intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." 98 Such a grand goal
is not often achieved through a single act, especially when there is a chance
that that one plotted attack may be thwarted before its commission. 99
Therefore, when the officers have probable cause to take the suspect into
custody for terrorist acts, it is a reasonable inference that the suspect is
aware of other acts leading to the ultimate consummation of an act of
terrorism.100 The Quarles Court would permit the officers to interrogate a
terrorist suspect under these circumstances because the Court noted that the
exception applies when officers have an objectively reasonable belief that
there is an immediate danger, which they would have in such situations.
The Quarles Court used a balancing test because in certain situations the
risk of the danger to the public outweighs the risk that the suspect's
constitutional right might be violated in the future. Given the potential
magnitude of the injury that could result from a terrorist attack, the risk to
the public's safety would be infinitely greater than the risk of coercion to
the suspect, especially when law enforcement officials are concerned about
stopping a possible terrorist attack and not trying to coerce the suspect to
confess.
The Quarles Court also ensured that the public-safety exception would
not be extended beyond its original purpose by limiting the admissibility of
statements to only those made in response to questions asked by the
officers to protect the public's safety. When the statements are introduced
into evidence, the prosecution could identify the context in which the
statements were made by providing a foundation of such.' 0 Additionally,
interrogations of this sort occur where the suspect is detained, which is
as a reasonable man to believe that his subject is committing or has committed a crime.").
98 See Fletcher,supra note 13.
99 See Jenna Baker McNeill, James Jay Carafano & Jessica Zukerman, Thirty Terrorist Plots
1 (2010), available at
Foiled: How the System Worked, 2405 BACKGROUNDER
http://thfmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg 2405.pdf (noting that thirty terrorist attacks against
the U.S. have been foiled since September 11, 2001, 28 of them successfully prevented by law
enforcement); see also Scott G. Erickson & Matt A. Mayer, A Comprehensive Suspicious Activity
Reporting (SAR) System Requires Action, 2636 BACKGROUNDER 1 (2012) (attributing the success of
law enforcement in the battle against terrorism to suspicious activity reporting).
100 See Kris, supra note 10 (stating that from interrogating suspected terrorists, law enforcement
officials have learned information about plots to attack U.S. targets); Jonathan F. Lenzner, From a
PakistaniStationhouse to the Federal Courthouse:A Confession's UncertainJourney in the US. -led
War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 297, 298 (2004) ("Preventing terrorist attacks
requires timely intelligence, often gained through confessions and physical evidence obtained from
suspects.").
101 See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (instructing that testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be
satisfies the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence).
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likely to be in public where witnesses could corroborate the context of the
conversation. In continuing to interpret the admissibility of the statements
in court narrowly, broadening the immediacy requirement will prevent
Mirandafrom being overwhelmed by the public-safety exception.102
Furthermore, even if the public-safety exception's application was
restricted to a narrow construction of an immediate threat, this exception
should still apply to suspected terrorists. The reason for the immediacy
requirement is to ensure that the police act out of necessity to negate the
threat. That is what ensures that there is minimal risk of a constitutional
violation. Because of the complexity of terrorist acts, from delayed
detonation of bombs to the involvement of numerous co-conspirators, it
may be necessary to act immediately in order to stop a terrorist act even
though the physical injury may not occur imminently.103 Incorporating the
magnitude and complexity of terrorist threats into the analysis to determine
whether the threat is immediate would produce a more complete and
realistic analysis of the situation. 104
"[T]he defeat of the U.S. is imminent."10 5 Mr. Shahzad declared this at
his sentencing for his attempted terrorist attack in Times Square.1 06 Mr.
Shahzad had already attempted to detonate a bomb in the most populous
area in the country, so it was reasonable for law enforcement officials to
believe that he planned to commit, and would attempt to commit, another
such act to ensure his goals were met. Given that the method in which he
tried to detonate the previous bomb was through a delayed detonator, it was
also reasonable to believe that Mr. Shahzad had another bomb waiting to
explode after his plane had left the country. In fact, Mr. Shahzad actually
admitted that he had plans to detonate another bomb two weeks later.07
102 However, the Court's willingness to consistently narrow the Miranda holding indicates that it
would not be especially concerned with the risk that Miranda would become nearly obsolete in its
application.
103 See Becker, supra note 18, at 869 (stating that it would be irrational for a bomb in a crowded
building to be less of a threat to public-safety than a gun simply because it is going to detonate hours
later); see also Charles Krauthammer, Miranda Warningsand Public Safety, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (May
7, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/229708 ("The public-safety exception
should be enlarged to allow law enforcement to interrogate, without Mirandizing, those arrested in the
commission of terrorist crimes (and make the answers admissible) - until law enforcement is satisfied
that vital intelligence related to other possible plots and threats to public safety has been sufficiently
acquired.").
104 See Becker, supra note 18, at 869 (arguing that although the future of the public-safety
exception is uncertain, there is no better situation for its validity to be tested than domestic terrorist
attacks). But see Sievert, supra note 85, at 324-25 ("Currently, no precedent exists for extending the
exception to admission of the results of detailed probing into long-term dangers.").
105 Markon, supranote 2.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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While two weeks would not be considered immediate under the facts of
Quarles, it is likely that Mr. Shahzad was working with several other
people that law enforcement officials would have to locate and detain in
order to prevent the attack from happening. Therefore, the fact that Mr.
Shahzad was arrested in far proximity from the bomb is irrelevant to the
immediacy requirement, because his being distanced from the bomb does
not affect the analysis of whether a physical threat is immediate.
In conclusion, because immediacy has a different meaning in the
terrorism context, explicitly recommending use of the public-safety
exception in the interrogation of terrorism suspects does not disturb the
holding in Quarles.
B. Congress would bejustified in, andshould, enact legislation to permit
the public-safety exception to apply to suspectedterroristsper se.
For law enforcement officials to be able to uniformly utilize the
exception to the extent of its power, Congress must enact legislation to that
effect. Because Mr. Shahzad pled guilty, it will never be an issue for the
courts whether the statements he made under the public-safety exception
would be admissible against him in trial. However, this is not a satisfactory
way to approach a task as crucial as protecting national security. Law
enforcement officials should know definitively when they encounter a
suspected terrorist that they are not damaging the chances of a conviction at
the expense of attempting to ensure the safety of the public. The Court has
given the Obama Administration all of the affirmation it needs to enact
legislation to this effect.
Congress should take heed of the limitations of legislative discretion set
forth in Dickerson v. United States.1os In Dickerson, the Court considered
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501,109 which Congress passed shortly
after Miranda, but went virtually unenforced for thirty years.110 The
108 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
109 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) ("(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by
the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall,
out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that
the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the
jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such
weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. (b) The trial judge in
determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the confession . . . .").
110 See Dery, supra note 53, at 56 ("Sometimes the most devastating response to an action taken by
another branch of government is simply to pretend it did not happen. This seems to be the approach
taken [in this situation] by the two powers competing with Congress, the executive and judicial
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legislative history revealed Congress' intent was to avoid Miranda by
continuing to consider whether statements made in custodial interrogations
were admissible based on whether they were voluntary.111 The Court ruled
that the statute was unconstitutional because it directly contravened its
holding in Miranda.112
The holding in Dickerson indicates that Congress may legislate
questioning procedures by law enforcement as long as it does not attempt
to override Miranda and its progeny.113 The Dickerson Court reiterated that
the purpose of Miranda was to provide constitutional guidelines for the
courts and law enforcement agencies to follow. 114 It noted that while the
scope of Miranda has been narrowed by subsequent decisions, the
"decision's core holding that unwarned statements may not be used as
evidence in the prosecution's case in- chief' has been reaffirmed.115
Therefore, as long as Congress does not take a blatantly contradictory
approach to the Court's decisions and adheres to the policies the Court has
followed for decades, a statute codifying the use of the public-safety
exception with terrorism suspects and limiting the application of Miranda
will be constitutional.
In drafting the legislation, Congress should enforce the principles
discussed in Part 111-A supra. The reasonable belief requirement should
remain an objective standard, with the burden on the prosecution to show
that a reasonable law enforcement official in the officer's position would
have believed that there was a threat to the public. When considering
whether this threat existed, courts can consider the factors that the Quarles
Court used in its balancing test, such as the location of the parties at the
time of the interrogation and what prompted the officers to take the suspect
into custody in the first place. Furthermore, although there should remain
an immediacy requirement, it should be consistent with the practicalities of
terrorism-related crimes. Specifically, it should only require that the
officials have a reasonable belief that it is necessary to get information
branches.").
Ill See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435-36 (stating that the language of the statute reveals the intent of
overruling Miranda); see also Dery, supra note 53, at 56 (pointing out the intention of the Congress, as
indicated in the Senate report, was to reverse the holding of Miranda and return to the voluntariness
test).
112 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (holding that Miranda is a constitutional rule that cannot be
trumped by statute).
113 See Dery, supra note 53, at 74, 76 (noting that in the Dickerson decision the Court was
"marking its territory" and "defended its turf").
I14 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (pointing out that the purpose of the Miranda decision was to give
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies to follow).
115 Idat443-44.
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from the suspect immediately in order to prevent future harm to the public.
The magnitude and complexity of the act the suspect is believed to have
committed would be relevant to determining the immediacy of the threat
and the reasonableness of the belief. Lastly, the only statements admissible
under the exception are those that are directly related to neutralizing the
threat to the public's safety.
Upon challenge before the Supreme Court, the statute would be
sustained as consistent with the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The public-safety exception's codification to apply to suspected terrorists
will comply with the intention of the Court to accommodate officers' needs
to act instinctively and not have their actions questioned retroactively. It
would also adhere to the ultimate goal of protecting public safety in
situations where the risk of coercion is minimal. As a result, Congress will
provide an effective interrogation tool to law enforcement in the wake of a
palpable threat while upholding the principles that underlie our system of
criminal justice.
CONCLUSION
The assignment of fundamental rights to criminal defendants makes the
federal criminal justice system no less effective than military commissions.
To the contrary, having a more balanced approach ensures public
confidence in the system. In addition, the federal criminal justice system
has many tools at its disposal to gather information from suspects and make
the most of that information to protect the nation from future acts of
terrorism.
One of the most beneficial, but underutilized, tools is the public-safety
exception to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. It allows
law enforcement officials to interrogate suspected criminals while
maintaining the opportunity to use the statements made by the suspect at
trial. The exception contemplates situations where the risk of public harm
is so great that it would outweigh the need to protect against selfincrimination. In the terrorism context, the use of this exception is
particularly effective, both as a matter of national security, but also as a
matter of upholding the ideals underlying our criminal justice system.
Therefore, Congress should codify a modified version of the public-safety
exception to make the criminal justice system as powerful as it can
constitutionally be.

